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1. Introduction
Mindreading is defined as an ability to impute
mental states of other people. One of the signature
tasks that measures this ability is called the false-
belief task. The false-belief task tests oneʼs
understanding of a typical event in which a
protagonist accidentally comes to hold a belief that is
not true. The task is normally presented by a puppet
enactment together with a verbal scenario, as used by
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985). In this scenario,
the doll, Sally, puts her marble into a basket. While she
is away, another doll, Ann, comes and moves the
marble into a box. The main question of the task is to
ask the children “where will Sally look for her marble,
either in the basket or in the box?” The correct
response is that Sally will look in the basket because
she has a false-belief that her marble is still in the
basket where she put it. However, children at or below
5 years of age normally answer incorrectly as they
know that the marble is in the box. This
developmental shift of mental representation has been
supported by mounting evidence, including a meta-
analyses (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).
More recent studies using a nonverbal version of the
false-belief task investigated childrenʼs anticipatory
looking behaviours. The findings suggest that some
form of mental representation is in place before two
years of age (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian
& Geraci, 2011). Mindreading ability that has been
studied using two forms of the false-belief tasks called
for further clarification of these relationships. The
classic false-belief scenario, described above, is
presented mainly with an accompanying verbal
description and the task requires verbal responses to
answer the question; therefore, it is often referred to
as the explicit false-belief task. On the other hand, the
recent studies, measuring anticipatory-looking
behaviours with an eye-tracking method, do not use a
verbal scenario for the false-belief event, and the task
requires the processing of perceptual information;
therefore it is referred to as the implicit false-belief
task. In this implicit false-belief task, the true belief
location (such as “the marble was moved into the box”)
was made unambiguous by totally removing the object
from the scene. Grosse Wiesmann, Friederici, Singer,
and Steinbeis (2017) found that three-year-old children
who failed a verbal version of the false-belief task
showed correct anticipatory-looking behaviours,
which qualified as a success for a nonverbal version of
the false-belief task, i.e. implicit false-belief task. These
results suggest that the implicit (non-verbal) version of
the false-belief task and the explicit (verbal) version of
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the task are not measuring the same thing. Grosse
Wiesmann et al. further provided evidence that only
the verbal version of false-belief task required
syntactic and executive processing to succeed. In
contrast, in their longitudinal investigation, Thoermer,
Sodian, Vuori, Perst, and Kristen (2011) found that
infants' correct anticipatory looking at a false-belief
event at 18 months predicted a success with the verbal
version of false-belief reasoning at 48 months. In an
attempt to resolve this puzzle, Saxe (2013) provides
useful explanations in that infants attribution of false-
beliefs and desires are limited to the context in which
the stimuli are presented, and lacked flexibility thus
showing some basic understanding of false-beliefs.
From this interpretation, it is possible that when
children pass the explicit false-belief task, they are
likely to be more flexible in ways of imputing mental
states and encoding linguistic information.
Language processing is one of the key elements for
imputing the mental state of the agent in the task.
Achim, Guitton, Jackson, Boutin, and Monetta (2013)
provided a useful framework for which the difference
in demand of processing linguistic/perceptual
information in the mindreading tasks may bring about
different outcomes in childrenʼs performance. They
argue that the aspects of processing involved in the
task need be addressed when addressing the
performance of mindreading. From this perspective,
the task with anticipatory-looking paradigm relies on
the perceptual level of processing, whereas the explicit
false-belief task with a puppet enactment requires
childrenʼs constant monitoring of perceptual and
linguistic information in order for them to respond
correctly to the protagonistʼs false-belief.
The explicit and implicit tasks for mental state
attribution have used different formats to present the
false-belief event and for the responses. Therefore it is
difficult to compare directly the performances of the
two tasks. For example, a lack of association between
verbal and nonverbal tasks as reported by Grosse
Wiesmann et al. may be due to the difference in task
format but not to the difference in the aspect of
processing needed for the task. To untangle this
situation, this study compared the anticipatory-
looking paradigm with and without language
processing for false-belief events. The main question
is what effect language processing placed on
anticipatory-looking behaviours. There is evidence
that adults who were subjected to extra cognitive load
in the dual task condition had a lower level of accuracy
in showing the correct anticipatory-looking behaviours
(Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012). It is therefore
possible that when the participants are faced with
linguistic information, that they spontaneously process
such information. Thus if the narratives are
accompanied with false-belief events in the
anticipatory-looking paradigm, such linguistic
information may facilitate or hinder the participants'
perceptual processing of false-belief events when
compared with the case when no linguistic information
was present.
The present study compares two conditions using
the anticipatory-looking paradigm to examine the
effect of processing linguistic information on children's
reasoning of false-beliefs.
2. Method
2.1. Participants.
93 preschool children (42 girls) aged between 4 and 6
year olds (M = 60. 1 months, SD = 9. 6 months)
participated in the study. They were from the mid- to
lower-middle socioeconomic status backgrounds
located in the Kansai area of Japan. Parental consents
were obtained prior to the study and the study design
was approved by the ethical committee of the author's
institution.
2.2. Design.
Two conditions were prepared for the mindreading
task. The non-verbal condition included a video clip
depicting the protagonist holding a false-belief because
of the unexpected transfer of a ball by the puppet
(bear), whereas the verbal condition included an
additional audio narration which was played
simultaneously with the video-clip. This study is a part
of a larger project investigating preschool children's
development of theory of mind, which included several
additional measures of explicit false-belief tasks,
executive functions and picture-sequencing tasks
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986).
－ 72 － － 73 －
2.3. Stimuli in the mindreading tasks
The video clip depicting the protagonist who came
to hold a false-belief was created based on the work of
Southgate et al. (2007). The task has two phases: the
first phase is familiarising the participants with the
context by showing the puppet (bear) putting the ball
into one of the two boxes which were aligned
horizontally. The female protagonist watches the
bearʼs actions, then she retrieves the ball by opening
the box in which the bear put the ball. Two
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Figure 1 Schematic images of the experimental task. The Japanese text describes the narrations which were played 
back simultaneously with the video in the verbal task only condition. The nonverbal condition was identical, but with 
the absence of Japanese narrations. 
  
Figure 1 Schematic images of the experimental task. The Japanese text describes the narrations which were played
back simultaneously with the video in the verbal task only condition. The nonverbal condition was identical,
but with the absence of Japanese narrations.
familiarisation trials in which the bear placed the ball
in one of the boxes were presented in a
counterbalanced way. After the familiarisation phase,
the main test phase began. The main false-belief event
was displayed as follows: the bear puppet used in the
familiarisation phase puts the ball into one of the two
boxes while the female protagonist was looking at the
scene. When the telephone rang, the female
protagonist turned away. While she was looking away,
the bear moved the ball to the other box and then took
the ball totally away from the scene. The main false-
belief task included one of the two versions of the false-
belief events, which differed in the timing of
movements of the ball. The schematic images of the
task are presented in Figure 1.
2.4. Apparatus
The Eye-tracker (Tobii X-60) tracked the
participantsʼ eye-movements to measure fixation
durations. The eye tracker was attached to the bottom
of a 17-inch screen of a laptop computer (DELL,
Precision 7710). The equipment was placed in a quiet
room.
2.5. Procedure. The children were tested individually.
Each child sat on a chair that was situated at a viewing
distance of approximately 50 cm away from the
computer screen and eye-tracker. After a 9-point
calibration of the eye tracker, the experiment was
conducted.
3. Results
Area of Interest (AOI)
In this study the child participantsʼ eye movements
were tracked to see if they would look at the box that
the protagonist wrongly believed she would find the
ball. The AOI was set when the protagonist turned
back towards the box and the chime sounded until the
video ended. The proportion of the fixation duration
was calculated for each test and was used for the
analyses.
Analyses of overall design.
The proportion of fixation was compared for the two
versions of the false belief video. There was no
significant difference in the proportion of fixation
duration for each location between the two versions of
false-belief task for: verbal condition: t(49) = 1.00 and t
(49) = .89, ps＞.1, and for nonverbal condition t(40) = 1.3
and t(40) = .13, ps＞.1.
A mixed ANOVA for 2 locations (correct/ incorrect)
x 2 experimental conditions (verbal/ nonverbal) was
conducted for the proportion of fixation duration
(Figure 2). There was a significant main effect for the
two conditions: F(1,91) = 5.09, p = .03. However, there
was no significant main effect for location: F(1, 91) =
2.34, p = .13; also there was no significant main effect
for the interaction between locations and conditions: F
(1, 91) = 1.39, p = .24. Planned comparisons for the level
of experimental conditions were conducted to
investigate whether correct anticipation was made
under the experimental conditions. For the nonverbal
condition, there was a trend that the child obervers
looked for a longer period of time at the correct
location than the incorrect location: F(1, 91) = 3.38, p =
.069, whereas no difference was found between these
locations under the verbal conditions. The correct
location is location where the protagonist believes that
the ball is located, which maybe a false belief.
To better understand the significant condition effect,
the measures for explicit false-belief tasks, picture-
sequencing tasks, executive processing as measured
by digit span, Dimensional Card Change Sort tasks and
receptive language were also examined and no
difference was found between these conditions (all ps
＞.1), suggesting that the random assignment of these
two conditions was not skewed by the processing
abilities of the children.
Analyses of the explicit FB task
The previous section examined the difference
between the experimental conditions with and without
language processing. It was found that the children
under the condition that involves language processing
did not make any preferential anticipation in their eye-
movements. In the present analysis, the children were
then split into two groups. The first group included
the children who passed the explicit false belief task
and the second group included the childen who did not
pass the task. It is possible that under the verbal
condition, the children who passed the explicit FB task
were able to perform well on the FB task assessed by
－ 74 － － 75 －
anticipatory looking, whereas the children who did not
pass the explicit FB task might have failed to
anticipate the correct location because of the required
language processing.
Childrenʼs scores for the explicit FB task were used
to make two explicit FB performance groups (explicit
FB task passed: n = 47; explicit FB not passed: n = 46).
Mixed ANOVAs for 2 locations (correct/ incorrect) x 2
experimental conditions (verbal/ nonverbal) were
conducted separately for these groups. For the group
that did not pass explicit FB task, there were no
significant main effects for condition F (1, 44) = . 50,
p = . 48, or for interactions between locations and
conditions: F (1, 44)= . 08, p = . 78. For the locations,
there was a trend for a significant effect of locations
for preferential looking at correct locations: F(1, 45 )=
3.46, p = .07.
For the group that passed the explicit FB task, there
was a significant main effect for the condition F(1, 45 )=
5.70, p = .021, but not for the locations F(1, 45 )= .06, p
= . 81 or for the interaction between locations and
conditions: F (1, 45) = 1. 91, p = . 17. The follow-up
analysis suggests that the significant effect of
condition was due to the significantly longer looking at
the incorrect location in the verbal condition than in
the nonverbal conditions: F(1, 45) = 7.44, p＜.01.
4. Discussion
The present study examined the effect of processing
linguistic information while viewing a false-belief event
under the condition of with or without simultaneous
verbal inputs about the false-belief scenario. When the
verbal inputs were presented, the child perceivers
looked longer at the AOIs. This result suggests that
the child perceiver was influenced by such verbal
inputs when viewing the false-belief event. When the
location of eye-gaze was considered, the perceivers
under the nonverbal condition made anticipatory-
looking based on the protagonistʼs false-belief, whereas
those in the verbal condition group gazed equally at
both locations. Although the statistical analyses
suggest that this trend needs to be interpreted with
caution, the processing of linguistic information played
a role that resulted in looking at both locations equally
longer. When the perceiversʼ performance on the
explicit false-belief task was considered, the children
who had demonstrated a full understanding of explicit
false-belief, looked significantly longer at the incorrect
location in the verbal condition than in the nonverbal
condition.
Why did some of the perceivers who had a full
understanding of false-belief not look at the AOI as
expected? One possibility is that these children
engaged with the scenario while looking at the scene
and monitoring the movement of the bear puppet and
the protagonist carefully. In this false-belief event in
this implicit FB task a hidden object was removed
from the scene while the protagonist was not looking
and before the protagonist reached for it. The
perceivers had experienced the false-belief event in
－ 74 － － 75 －
Figure 2. Proportion of fixation duration for gazing at the location in two conditions
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Figure 2 Proportion of fixation duration for gazing at the location in two conditions
which the hidden object remained at the scene in the
explicit false-belief task. Thus when the verbal
information was accompanied with the implicit FB
task, the perceivers might have been confused by
what they expected to see in the location as in the
explicit FB task. In the nonverbal condition, because
the information related to false-belief event was
presented only perceptually, the perceivers might not
be aware of such a difference. In the verbal condition,
albeit the perceptual and linguistic information are
both related to the false-belief, additional linguistic
processing might have hindered the perceivers in
responding in a way that even infants were able to do
when only perceptual processing was required. The
adults in the anticipatory-looking paradigm under the
extra cognitive load condition, such as listening to a
series of letters or even a higher cognitive demand
such as 2 back letter repetition, affected their gazing at
correct locations (Schneider et al., 2012). These
findings support the possibility of the interpretation of
the present study that the children were influenced by
the extra linguistic information even though it was
coherent with the perceptual information.
In terms of the framework of Achim et al, the
distinction between the information presented
linguistically and perceptually in the task is important,
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Figure 3. Proportion of fixation duration for gazing at the location in two conditions when analysed by the groups that 
passed explicit FB task and that did not pass. 
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and it resonates with the present approach that
compared the same anticipatory-looking behavior
while controlling for the presentation of linguistic
information. The implicit false-belief task that
employed eye-gaze measurement has been assumed to
differ from the standard explicit false-belief task in
terms of executive demands and that there was
minimal association between the two tasks (Grosse
Wiesmann et al., 2017). It is possible to suggest that
such differences in executive demand may be derived
from how the task is presented through different
channels such as linguistic and perceptual levels. The
task required for multiple levels of processing may
inherently require a greater degree of resources in
processing each channel.
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子どものマインドリーディング処理過程における言語の影響
学芸学部 心理学科 辻 弘美
要 旨
本実験は、言語処理がマインドリーディングに与える影響を検討するため、ナレーションの有無
条件において登場人物の誤信念の理解課題を暗黙的に正しく処理できるかどうか、視線注視行動を
測定した。93 名の 5歳児の協力者がどちらかの条件で登場人物の誤信念を理解しているかどうかを
検討する課題ビデオを視聴した。ナレーション無し（言語処理無し）条件では、協力者の視線注視
行動は、登場人物が誤信念にしたがって行動をすることを予期した動きをみせ、誤信念を暗黙的に
理解している傾向を示す結果が得られた。一方、ナレーション有り（言語処理有り）条件において、
同じ課題ビデオを視聴した協力者の視線注視行動は、登場人物の誤信念に関係なく、ランダムな動
きをみせた。これらの結果について、言語処理の負荷とマインドリーディングとの関係について考
察した。
キーワード：心の理論、アイトラッカー、言語処理、マインドリーディング
